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PROPERTY AND EXPROPRIATION: THEMES AND
V ARIATIONS IN AMERICAN LAW
Carol M. Rose"
Most ofus think. that as anation, theUnitedStates is and always has been
very conscious ofproperty. The most legendary of our revolutionary slogans
was "notaxationwithoutrepresentation," whichis fundamentally abouttaking
property without consent Almost from its inception, our Constitution has
included a clause protecting property against takings for public purposes
withoutcompensation, whereas someother countries' constitutions hedgetheir
property clauses with flexible language to take into account the ''public
interest,"l Of-as in the case of our Canadian neighbors-dispense with
constitutional property protection altogether.2
We have received a particularly large dose of the constitutional takings
clause in the last few years, as conservative public interest groups have used
theproperty clause to attack many environmental and land use regulations as
unconstitutional takings ofproperty. Indeed, property-rights proponents now
seem poised to use takings doctrine to demand compensation for all kinds of
regulatory change, since almost any regulatory change has some impact on
someone's property values. This question of regulatory takings is the main
subject ofthis article, but my plan is to frame the regulatory takings issue in
a larger context of expropriations in American law.
Given our history andproclivities towardproperty, it may seem abit odd
to talk of an American tradition of expropriation. But a large part of my
argument is that, far from being unknown or highly unusual, expropriations
havebeenverymuchapartofour propertylaw-so muchsothat wegenerally
do not even notice them as such.
"Gordon Bradford Tweedy Professor of Law and Organization at Yale. B.A Antioch
College, 1962; PhD Cornell University; 1970; J.D. University of Chicago, 1977. Earlier
versions of this Article were delivered at the University of California and the Harvard Law
School, from whose members I received numerous excellent suggestions; I would like to
express special thanks to Frank Michelman, Harry Scheiber, and Joseph Singer for their
helpful comments. I am alsoparticularly grateful to the University ofUtah College'ofLawfor
inviting me to deliver the Leary Lecture on which this Article is based.
lSee A VANDERWALT, THECoNSTITUTIONALPROPERTYCLAUSB17-21 (1997) (noting
exceptions innewSouth African Constitution'spropertyclause). Van derWalt's larger thesis,
however, is that many countries' practices converge on a balancing of private and public
interest in their constitutional protection ofproperty. See id. at 5, 8-15.
2See, e.g., Archibald v. The Queen, 146 D.LR 4th 499,529-31 (Fed. Cl 1997) (dis-
cussing omission of property rights from protection under Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms)
1
HeinOnline -- 2000 Utah L. Rev. 2 2000
2 UTAH LAW REVIEW [2000: 1
This is not to say, however, that the stability ofproperty is unimportant.
There is a longstanding and very powerful argument that the stability of
property is essential to economic well-being. Security of property, it is said,
induces people to work as nothing else does, because property allow us to take
the rewards of our labor.s Moreover, property rights identify the parties who
are interested in given resources, and thus allow people to trade for what they
want rather than arguing andfighting.4 Trade, inturn, makes labor all themore
valuable, because, as Adam Smith noticed long ago, trade permits specializa-
tion, and all other things being equal, specialized labor produces higher
quantities and qualities of goods.5 Hence not only does property induce people
to labor directly, but by enabling trade to take place, property also makes
everyone's labor more productive and valuable, a fact that indirectly induces
still more labor-more thrift, more careful planning, more husbanding and
skillful deployment ofresources-moving us in a happy spiral towards general
prosperity.
The idea that property induces labor, and hence wealth, has been
contested,6 but it has nevertheless seemed very persuasive over a long time.
The idea lies behind a point argued with only slight exaggeration by the
Berkeley ecological historian Carolyn Merchant-that the classical economic
writers expectedproperty torestorehumankind to a newEden.7 Whyproperty?
Becauseit is property that yokes the sinful and self-interested nature ofhuman
beings to the Biblical iryunction to labor.8
3Por the classic statement, see JEREMYBENTHAM, 1 PRINCIPLES OFTHE CIVIL CODE, pt.
I, §§ 7-9, in Theory ofLegislation (C.K. Ogden ed. 1931) (1789). See also RICHARD POSNER,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw 30 (3d ed. 1986) (citing 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMEN-
TARIES ON THE LAws OF ENGLAND 4, 7 (1766)). But see Duncan Kennedy & Prank
Michelman, Are Property and Contract Efficient?, 8 HOFSTRA L. REv. 711, passim (1980)
(challenging arguments for efficiency of property and contract).
4Clifford G. Holderness, A Legal Foundation for Exchange, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 321,
322-26 (1985); cf. Michael A Heller, The Boundaries ofPrivate Property, 108 YALE L. J.
1163, 1165-67 (arguing that if resources are fragmented into too many discrete individual
property rights, transactions costs impede their re-assembly in to usable wholes).
sSee AdamSmith, AnInquiry into the Nature and Causes ofThe Wealth ofNations, 3-6
(Encyclopedia Britanica, 1952) (1776) (explaining effects of division oflabor).
6See Kennedy & Michelman, supra note 3, at 717-20.
7See Carol M. Rose, The Several Futures ofProperty: OfCyberspace and Folk Tales,
Emission Trades and Ecosystems, 83 MINN. L. REv. 129, 130-31 (1998) (discussing
Merchant's Theory).
8See id.
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All the same, property regimes do not come naturally to sinful, or as we
nowsay, self-interested,humanbeings.9 Despitethesociobiological temptation
to describe animal territoriality as a kind ofproto-property,1o territoriality is
not the same thing as property. We see territoriality in the way that animals
constantly guard some area against challenge, but the distinctive hallmark of
property, as opposed to territoriality, is the absence ofchallenge from others.
That is, what makes something "property" is precisely that others routinely
recognize and respect one's claims; others refrain from grabbing your things
and running away with them, and thus all ofus are relieved ofthe debilitating
expense and effort of constant vigilance.ll Naturally, these patterns of self-
restraint and recognition sometimes fail, but when they do, the regime of
property and commerce unravels, because individual property-holders no
longer havethe confidenceto invest andtrade and toundertake all thoseuseful
behaviors that property induces.
Even taking at face value the arguments for property, the origins and
maintenanceofproperty regimes are somewhat mysterious. Becauseproperty
is a productivepattern ofmutual self-denial, modern gamewould suggest that
property relations present a prisoner's dilemma, where people's individual
interests defeat their own larger collective good.12 But somehow or other,
property regimes also represent the quintessentially human solution to this
dilemma. David Hume thought that property was not natural in a primary
sense, but was indeed natural in the sense that we humanbeings are naturally
inventive, and that we tend to invent useful institutions.13 Indeed, he and that
other great representative of the Scottish Enlightenment, Adam Smith,
identified the recognition ofproperty as ''justice'' itself.14
9See ALBERTO.HIRsCHMAN, THBPASSIONSANDTHE!NTEREsTs:PormCALARGUMENTS
FOR CAPITALISMBEFORBlTs TRIuMPH 54-62 (1977) (describing transformation ofwhat had
been thought to be sin of avarice into more beneficent "interest" in eighteenth-century
thought).
lOSee, e.g., RICHARD PIPES, HUMANNATURBANDTHEFAILOF COMMUNISM, BUllETIN
OF THE AMERrCAN ACADEMY OF ARTS AND SClENCES. Jan. 1996, at 38,41-44 (using animal
territoriality as part of effort to show that Soviet inroads into private property were contrary
to human nature).
USee CARoLM. ROSE. PROPERTYANDPERSUASION: EssAYS ONTHEHrSTORY, THEORY,
AND RImrORICOFOWNERSHIP 37 (1994) (noting thatpropertyrequires participants torefrain
from stealing, cheating, etc. in order to avoid impossible burden ofpolicing).
12See id. at 35-37.
I3DAVID HUME, A'I'REATISE OF HUMANNATURB. 484, 488-91 (L A Selby-Bigge ed.,
2d ed. 1978) (1739-40).
14See id.; ADAM SMITH,l.EcruRBs ON JURISPRUDENCE 5 (R. L. Meek et al. eds., 1978)
(identifying '1ustice" with recognition and maintenance ofproperty rights).
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In our moremodern day, liberal Americans tend tobesomewhatskeptical
about such encomiums to property, particularly on political grounds: why
accord such high praise to what seems to be a plutocratic institution?IS In
answer to that, however, thereis a long string ofvenerable arguments precisely
about the political importance of property: that property gives owners the
independence necessary for participation in the political order; that property
acts as a concrete symbol for thinking about rights more generally; that
property and commercediffusepower; that experience withproperty and trade
soften manners and makepeople attentive to one another's needs, as ofcourse
they must be in a democracy; that thepursuit ofproperty distracts people and
disarms them from cruel and divisive ruptures over religion or ethnicity; and
finally, that democratic government is in some ways a luxury good-that is,
that free speech andpress andvoting only aremeaningful values topeopleafter
they have built up some modicum of wealth-which they can only have
through the security ofproperty. I have described all these arguments at length
elsewhere,16 and while none creates an unassailable case for the stability of
property, the very amas~ing of all these assertions of property's political
virtues must give one pause. Even free speech might be hard put to rival the
sheer number and persistence ofproperty's claims for political pre-eminence
in democratic governments.17
Onthe other hand, whether onelooks at property as a "merely" economic
matter or a political one, democracies have a problemmakingproperty secure,
a problem rather akin to the prisoners' dilemma of game theory. The classic
concernabout democratic governments is that they areruledbymajorities, that
majorities can be taken over by factions, and that factions unsettle property
rights by shortsightedly advancing their own projects at the expense of those
who are out ofpower.1S Theresulting insecurity ofproperty, it is said, will sap
the energy that created wealth in the first place, and the loss of this wealth-
lSSee, e.g., JENNIFER NEDELSKY, PRIvATE PROPERTY AND THE LIMITs OF AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAIlSM: THE MADISONIAN FRAMEwORK AND ITS LEGACY 242-49, 253-54,
271-72 (1990) (decrying property's bond to existing wealth distributions and hierarchy).
16See Carol M. Rose, Property as the Keystone Right?, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 329,
333-61 (1996) (evaluating seven arguments regarding why property rights are the most
important rights in liberal constitutional order).
17See id. at 362-63.
18SeeTHEFEDERAIlST 10, at 78-81 (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (describing dangers of
faction and insecurity of property in pure democracies); James L. Kainen, The Historical
Framework/or Reviving Constitutional Protection/or Property and Contract Rights, 79
CORNELLL.REv. 87, 91-102 (1993) (describing some modern versions of traditional doubts
about democratic governments' treatment ofproperty) .
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creatingdrivemayinturnunderminedemocratic government.19 Thatis whythe
great Utilitarian thinker Jeremy Bentham said, back around 1800, that in any
conflictbetweenequality and security ofproperty, it is imperativethat security
prevai1-even where the inequality is so striking as in the case of serfdom or
slavery.20
Given the mixed political and economic roles for stable property, and
given the widespread theoretical worry that democracies may be subject to
systematic disruptions of property, it should not be a surprise that concerns
about property actually 100m fairly large in the law of democratic countries.
The last decade's flurry of global constitution-making has brought such
concerns tothefore, particularly as nations havecastoffauthoritariansocialist
regimes and attempted to locate property within neWly democratized political
principles?l And it should also not be a big surprise that democratic govern-
ments often try to enforce limitations on themselv~, in order to protect
property.
My discussion of the subject of expropriation does not intend to say that
those efforts arefutile, but rather that they must beunderstood to have certain
limits. My argument is that property as an institution in fact is packed with
disruptions, and that legal property regimes routinely ''build in" a variety of
rights-disruptions that amount to expropriations. More than that, any regime
that failed to do so would collapse of its own brittleness.
How, then, might legal regimes disrupt stable property'relations? I will
describe as "Type I" or "housekeeping" disruptions those stemming from the
management of property's routine business-buying, selling, settling in, and
neighbor disputes over property. Property regimes are always subject to
occasional conflicts and low-level altercations; there are routiilely trespasses,
nuisanceclaims, hitches andmistakes intransactions and contractobligations,
along with occasional overreaching. We often call on government to contain
theseproblems. Butmost interesting for mypurposes, governmental authority
sometimes vindicates thosewho disrupt formally correct claims, andit does so
for reasons having to do with the overall housekeeping management of a
propertyregime. So much arethese governmental disruptions simplytakenfor
19See FEoERAIlST 10, supra note 18, at 77-81; see also Rose, supra note 16 at 358
(describing arguments linking security of property, wealth, and continued democratic
government).
1!JSee Bentham, supra note 3, at 119. Bentham did go on to say that slavery might be
gradually eradicated, but keeping the principle ofproperty intact See id. at 122-23.
21See Cass R. Sunstein, On Property and Constitutionalism, 14 CARDOZO L REv. 907,
passim (1993) (considering role of property particularly in post-Soviet European constitu-
tions); see also Van der Walt, supra note 1, at 1-4 (discussing reconsideration of property
relations in light of new South African constitution).
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granted that we barely even notice them, even though, in some sense, they
amount to expropriations.
A second class oflegal disruptions ofproperty are the "Type II" changes
that I will call "regulatory disruptions." These are the alterations in property
rights that occur when environmental, demographic, or technological changes
necessitate readjustments ofproperty rights, normally throughregulation. For
example, too much traffic on your streetnecessitates a traffic light. This means
that you have to stop, and that you get slightly less value from your BMW.
Too much traffic may also mean that you have to equip your car with a
pollutioncontroldevice, whichcosts you something, and diminishes your value
a bit more. Both are Type II or regulatory rights disruptions.
Type III disruptions are what I will call "extraordinary." These are the
rights alterations that accompany revolutions and warfare or other upheavals
that create massive overthrowings of existing property rights and resource
uses.
Of these three kinds of disruption, I am most centrally interested in the
second, the "regulatory disruptions," since that is the current location for the
battles over property and takings of property. But these Type II disruptions
will take only a limitedportion ofthis Article. The Article instead will attempt
to illuminate Type II disruptions by comparison to Type I and Type III rights
alterations-that is, the kinds of disruption that are either so routine that we
tend not even to notice them, or so massive that we simply discount them as
aberrations from normal governmental affairs. Those two other types of
disruptions-everydayandrevolutionary-framewhatis at stakeinthetakings
cases.
I. TYPE I DISRUPTIONS-EVERYDAY BUSINESS AND HOUSEKEEPING RULES
Inthe UnitedStates, the legal rules in everyday disputes-encroachments
or noise, deals that fall through and the like-are not the subject of any great
turmoil, at least not now. Most ofthese matters are managed informally or by
statelaw, and whiletherearemany minor variations, thebasic groundrules are
fairly clear. You are not supposed to trespass on your neighbor's yard without
permission, nor should you make too much noise at your Saturday nightparty;
and if you arrange to make a business deal, or borrow money, or sell your
house or your car, you are supposed to keep your promise, with some excuses
for such matters as fraud, duress, and mistake. These everyday matters were
not always so even-tempered, especially with regard to contracts. As is well-
known, in the early days of the republic, state interference with contractual
obligations-in the form of liberal debt relief and tinkering with cur-
rency-was a source of great consternation to commercial interests, and one
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of the reasons for calling the Constitutional Convention.22 As for trespass, a
great many oftheoriginal settlers intheWest were infact trespassers, as inthe
Gold Rush in California; their trespasses occurred on the public lands as well
as on other private parties' claims, not to speak of the encroachments on the
routinely-ignored claims ofnativepeoples.23 Nevertheless, by thebeginning of
the 21st century, the ordinary contours of trespass law, nuisance, and
obligation of contract are well-established, especially in instances of disputes
between private parties.
One ofthe tasks ofgovernment is simply to enforce property rights in all
these dimensions-that is, to enforce a property regime's necessary require-
ments of forbearance and mutual respect for rights against disruptive
individuals. Butthereis considerably morethanthat to government's activities
intheareaofeverydaydisruptions. Governments alsoquietlybutunobtrusively
perform a great number of functions that permit people to transact with their
property in a reasonably secure way. For my purposes, the most interesting
aspect of these governmental reassurances is that, in fact, they do not always
vindicatetherights ofthetrueowner. Instead, they allowthe disrupter to claim
some disputed property right-resulting in Type I housekeeping expropria-
tions.
Letmegive an example: state governments all providerecording systems
for landso thatpotentialbuyers or lenders have a public sourceofinformation
about prior claims.24 This is particularly important to smooth transfers of
property, since buyers and lenders need some way to find out about prior
claims against land, as well as some way to publicize their own interests in the
relevant property.2S But observe that if Buyer Bart fails to record his claims,
he runs the risk of losing bis property to a later purchaser, Lydia, who
22See GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REpUBliC, 1776-1787, at
404-06 (1969) (describing dissatisfaction with 17805 state legislatures' debt relief and
currency policies).
ZJSee Charles W. McCurdy, Stephen 1. Field and Public Land Law Development in
California, 1850-1866: A Case Study ofJudicialResourceAllocation in Nineteenth-Century
America, 10 L. & SOC'Y REv. 235, 235-38, 246-48 (1976) (describing settlement on as-yet
unsurveyed federal land and miners' disputes with other agricultural claimants). Regarding
the Gold Rush miners encroachments on tribal areas, particularly native fisheries, see ARTH-
UR F. McEVOY, THE FIsHERMAN'S PROBLEM: EcOLOGY AND LAw IN THE CALIFORNIA FIsH-
ERIES, 1850-1980, at 47-48 (1986) (describing miners' and loggers' damage to fishing
streams used by natives).
24See, e.g., John L. McCormack, Torrens and Recording: Land Title Assurance in the
ComputerAge, 18 W.M.L. REv. 61, 67-69 (1992) (describing history ofAmerican recording
systems).
2SSee id. at 74-76 (describing importance ofsecure title in trade and link between title
security and information system).
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subsequently buys same property without notice ofBart's earlier claim. Thus
the recording acts publicize and simplify property transactions, but they do so
at the cost of occasionally destroying formal rights. If Bart fails to use
government-provided publicizing devices, he will find that the government's
courts will ignore his claims and hand his rights over to Lydia, even if her
formal claim is vastly weaker.26
Thesemundanerecording issues giveus someclues aboutthereasons why
governmental actions sometimes elevatetheclaims oftheparty with aninferior
claim over the formally superior one: the pattern arises in large part from the
fact that most property is alienable. This means that any given property-and
especially a durable property likeland- may have a succession of owners, or
it may be encumbered by a variety of claims. It is imperative that the legal
status of such property be kept relatively simple and transparent in order to
avoid confusionto thesemultipleor successiveinterest holders.27 Recording or
registration schemes are designed to make claims transparent; hence unre-
corded claims may be wiped out for the sake of transparency. Literary critics
may argue that transparencyis a myth,28 but if so, it is a myth very much alive
in the governmental management of property-and the imperatives of
transparency sometimes demand the sacrifice ofperfectly good formal claims.
There are other examples of this phenomenon. State governments and
their courts provide a number of ways to clear title to property when it is
encumbered by obsolete or uncertain claims. The best-known of these is the
doctrine of "adverse possession," a judicial elaboration of statutes of
limitations on actions to regain possession of land. Let us suppose that Lydia
grows petunias on a strip of Bart's land, mistakenly thinking that the strip
USee Board of Education ofCenter Sch. Dist. No.1 v. Miles, 207 N.E.2d 181, 183-84
(N.Y. 1965) (describing effect of recording acts on title claims); Cf. American Land Co. v.
Zeiss, 219 U.S. 47, 59-62 (1911) (upholding quiet title statute, adopted after San Francisco
earthquake, even though proceeding by longterm lessee wiped out claim of alleged
reversionary owner); Texaco Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 516, 530-38 (1982) (statute requiring
periodicre-recording ofunused mineral claims upheld against "Takings," Contracts, and Due
Process Clauses challenges); United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 107-08 (1985) (upholding
Federal statute requiring annual reporting ofunpatented mineral claims and treating failure
to report as abandonment ofclaim against takings challenge); Presbytery of Southeast Iowa
v. Harris 226 N.W.2d 232, 242 (Iowa 1975) (upholding statute requiring filing notice of
claims under reverter clause).
ZTSee Carol M. Rose, What Government CanDo For Property (and Vice Versa), in THE
FuNDAMENTAL INTERRELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AND PROPERTY 209, 213
(Warren J. Samuels & Nicholas Mercurio, eds., 1999) (describing necessity of clarity where
property may have multiple or successive ownership).
28See, e.g., Robert Scholes,Is There a Fish in This Text, in ONSIGNS 308, 309-310, 318
(Michael Blonsky ed., 1985) (describing deceptiveness and partiality of what seems to be
"perfectly transparent language").
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belongs to her. Ifshe continues without interference from Bart for somefairly
extended statutory period (anywhere from six to twenty years), she may well
beableto claimthe strip for herself, despiteBart's superior formal title. Tobe
sure, Bart will be protected ifLydia actually knew about his superior claim;
in general, adverse possessionlaw will not protect the willful trespasser, who
could have asked permission but decided to barge in without asking.29 But so
long as she simply makes a reasonable mistake, Bart may lose his property.
Onemajor reasonfor this divestment is to protect third parties: outsiders
may rely on what appears to beLydia's ownership. In one such scenario, third
party Thadeus may buy Lydia's house thinking that the yard includes the
petunia garden. In order toprotectThad, the courts will retrospectively accord
ownership to Lydia, the trespasser, so that the innocent purchaser (Thad) can
trump the claims of the true owner (Bart). While adverse possession and
similar prescriptive claims come as something of a shock to beginning law
students, they are in fact quite routine elements ofproperty regimes.30 Indeed,
every property regimemust find some way to deal with questions of squatters,
and where squatters hang on for long periods, they and their successors tend
to displace formal owners.
Adversepossessioncanrepresent a quite drastic andcompletedivestment
of one's rights to a given property, but everyday property transactions entail
numerous other examples of less drastic, partial divestments. Among these
partial expropriations are remedies that take the form of damages. Let us
suppose, for example, that neighboring Lydia, relying on a mistaken survey,
inadvertently builds a garage over Bart's property boundary, an act that is
technically a continuing trespass. But because an injunction could entirely
waste Lydia's existing capital investments-or alternatively, permit Bart to
extract a large fee to buyout his rights-courts will sometimes award Bart
only the remedy ofmoney damages.31
29Jn a number of states, the adverse possessor must have a "claim of right," which
effectively precludes erosion of an owner's rights in favor of the willful trespasser; in an
interesting study, Richard Helmholz found that even where "claim of right" is not formally
required, courts seldom find for the willful trespasser, suggesting a widely-shared intuition
against purposeful market bypass. See RH. Helmholz, Adverse Possession and Subjective
Intent, 61 WASH. U. LQ. 331, 332 (1983) (discussing implication or intent and judge-held
ethical values on adverse possession determinations).
3OSee, e.g., Hawkins v. Barney's Lessee, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 457, 463 (1831) (upholding
Kentucky statute providing for adverse possession).
31See, e.g., Urban Site Venture IILtd. Partnership v. Levering Assoc. Ltd. Partnership,
665 A.2d 1062,1067 (Md. 1995) (denying injunction against encroaching building where
builders relied innocently on mistaken survey). For an earlier case summarizing 19th century
case law, see Goldbacher v. Eggers, 76 N.Y.Supp. 881, 883-86 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1902).
Innocence and good faith effort is important in cases of this sort, however. See, e.g., Welton
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Damage remedies-or so-called "liability rules"- have been much
discussed in the last generation as an alternative to the "property rules" that
protect property rights by all-or-nothing injunctive relief.32 Indeed, damage
remedies have received excellent press in law-and-economic circles, in part
because they suppress unneighborly behavior on Bart's part-that is, the so-
called "rent-seeking" in which an ownerhold outs for no reason except tomake
claims on another.33 Under a liability rule, the property owner gets some
remedial recompense, but not the full payoffthat he might haveextracted ifhe
could completely veto use by another.
But this of course means that property remedied by liability rules is not
the same as property remedied by property rules-in effect, liability remedies
make Bart's property subject to a kind of option, as law-and-economics
scholars have pointed out.34 No doubt this is the reason why liability rules in
practice are hemmed in by a variety of good-faith requirements and institu-
tional constraints:3S liability rules can effectively undercut an owner's "right
to exclude," a right, by the way, thathas beendescribed as themost fundamen-
v. 40 East Oak St Bldg. Corp. 70 F.2d 377, 382-83 (7th Cir. 1934) (granting injunction
where builder had rushed through construction in spite of pending litigation over setback
requirement); Parkview Assoc. v. City of New York, 519 N.E. 2d 1372,525 N.Y.S.2d 176
(N.Y. 1988) (describing an analogous case a developer had to lop several stories off a
building, since a more diligent search would have revealed the mistake in the building
permit). See also Richard D. Lyons, Beheading a Tower to Make it Legal, N.Y. T1MEs, Feb.
28, 1988, § 8, at 9, col. 2 (reporting facts of Parkview case).
32The terms originate in the famous article by Guido Calabresi and A Douglas
Melamed, PropertyRules, LiabilityRules, andInalienability: One View ofthe Cathedral, 85
HARv. L REv. 1089, 1092-93 (1972). For a study of the voluminous citations to this article,
see James E. Krier and Stewart J. Schwab, The Cathedral at Twenty-Five: Citations and
Impressions, 106 YALEL J. 2121, passim (1997).
33See Ian Ayres and Eric Talley, Solomonic Bargaining: Dividing a Legal Entitlement
to Facilitate Coasean Trade, 104 YALEL. J. 1027, 1038-39 (1995)(analyzing holdoutprob-
lem as that of concealing "private information" about one's own value on entitlement and
arguing that liability rules can help to force revelation of private information and thus
facilitate trade); cf Robert P. Merges, Contracting into LiabilityRules: IntellectualProperty
Rights and CollectiveRights Organizations, 84 CAL. L REv. 1293, 1304-1307, 1392 (1996)
(arguing that property rules are preferable to liabilityrules in facilitating trade ofintellectual
property rights).
34See Carol M. Rose, The Shadow of the Cathedral, 106 YALE LJ. 2175, 2178-79
(1997) (describing scholarship arguing that liabilityrule "protection" gives owner less ample
property right, subject to option of another).
3SSee Richard A Epstein, A Clear View ofThe Cathedral: The Dominance ofProperty
Rules, 106 YALELJ. 2091,2111-20 (1997) (describing some institutional constraints on use
of liability rules). For requirements of good faith, see Helmholz, supra note 29, at 337-41.
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tal of all property rights in some of the recent "takings" cases.36 In that sense,
liability rules-like the operations of the recording acts or adverse posses-
sion-are legally-sanctioned rights disruptions.
For another exampleoftheseTypeI, legallysanctionedrights-disruptions,
onecouldcitelimitations ontheuseofdeedrestrictions. Undoubtedly, themost
famous deed restrictions inAmericanlaw aretheracially restrictivecovenants
that were overturned in 1948 in Shelley v. Kramer.37 But there are vast
numbers of other more innocuous deed restrictions in neighborhoods all over
the country, and they are routinely upheld in the courts. Probably the most
common are those requiring that all the properties in a neighborhood be used
only for singlefamily dwellings. But supposethat our man Bartnegotiates and
pays for some special deed restrictions on a neighbor's property-e.g. that the
neighbors stage a Maypole dance every Mayday for the viewing pleasure of
Bart and subsequent owners of Bart's house. Courts may enforce the deal as
a personal contractbetweenBart andhis neighbors who signed it, but they are
very unlikely to enforce Bart's demand against a later purchaser of the
neighbor's house, simply because such an arrangement is too odd and
unexpected to future purchasers, and does little to enhance land values.38 On
occasion, a court may decline to enforce a deed restriction if surrounding
circumstances have changed sufficiently to render the restrictions point-
less-for example, ifBart insists on a single-family residence restriction after
the surroundings have been taken over as a rail yard39 As with other rights-
eroding doctrines, extinguishment through "changed conditions" is quite
constrained.40 Still, in all these instances Bart's property interest vanishes
without compensation-and with surprisingly little controversy.41
36See, e.g., Nollan v. California Coastal Comm.'n, 483 U.S. 825, 831 (1987) (reiterating
importance ofright to exclude others); Loretto v. TeleprompterManhattan CATV Corp, 458
U.S. 419, 435-36 (1982) (calling right to exclude others "one of the most treasured strands
in an owner's bundle of property rights"); see also Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the
Right to Exclude, 77 NEBR. L. REv. 730, 747-48 (1998) (describing right to exclude as most
central aspect of property).
37334 U.S. 1,20 (1948) (holding that state grant ofjudicial enforcement of restrictive
agreements violated equal protection mandates).
38See, e.g., Caullett v. Stanley Stilwell & Sons, Inc., 170 A.2d 52,54 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1961) (refusing to uphold as covenant running with land right to build house on
owner's property)
39REsTATEMENT (1inRD) OF PROPERTY, § 7.10 (2000).
4OId. at 395 (describing prerequisites for termination due to changed conditions as
"stringent").
41Id. at395-96. ButseeRichard A. Epstein, Notice andFreedom ofContract in theLaw
ofServitudes, 55 S. CAL. L. REv. 1353, 1358 (1982) (opposing judicial termination under
changed condition doctrine and suggesting eminent domain as alternative).
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Why does thelaw allow these inroads into people'sproperty interests? As
I said earlier, a very important underlying reason stems from property's
alienability. Property rights (generally unlike contractual rights) may last a
long time and may pass through many hands, including the hands of strangers
to the original property-creating transactions. Indeed, property rights in land
could, in theory, persist indefinitely (as long as the land lasts). Hence, a given
piece of land might be subject to many claims, both simultaneously and
successively. To assure relatively easy transfers ofproperty among the many
potential claimants, courts and legislatures have devised a variety of quite
subtle housekeeping rules to keep property claims relatively simple, to
discourage claims that are so obscure or idiosyncratic that no one expects or
values them, to repress obstructionist or rent-seeking behavior by holders of
formal but useless claims, and to get rid of unused or obsolete claims
altogether.42 The benefit of these legal razor blades is that they keep property
rights relatively legible, and thus more easily alienable and tradeable. But the
cost is that true owners may lose rights-rights that they have paid for-over
against others whose formal claims are weak or nonexistent.
Hence, the governmental management of everyday transactions about
property, while centrally concerned with the vindication of formal property
rights, is not just about that. Co~ andlegislatures are also concernedto keep
the entire system of rights simple, manageable, and legible to outsiders and
newcomers-a pattern that is undoubtedly especially important in a nation of
immigrants like our own.43 To further those concerns of simplicity and
manageability, courts and legislatures adopt background housekeeping rules;
but these background rules themselves sometimes result in the forfeiture or
expropriation of formal individual rights. Generally, such forfeitures are
neither systematic nor partisan, and they are unlikely to have larger redistribu-
tive impacts. Rather, the simplifying devices add up to a kind ofimpartial set
42See Rose, supra note 27, 212-18 (explaining potential govemment roles in property
relations); see also Epstein, supra note 41, at 1353-55 (1982) (noting that multiple interests
in land make notice-giving devices particularly important, even to point of trumping formal
canons of ownership). For an important new article on simplifying rules in property, see
Thomas W. Merrill and Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law ofProperty:
The Numerus Clausus Principle 100 YALB L. J. 1 (2000).
43See JAMESC.SCOIT,SEEINGllKEASTATE:HowCERTAINSCHEMESTo!MPROVETHE
HUMAN CONDmONHAVEFAILED (1998) 35-36 (linking relatively simple land tenure system
to extension ofstatepower). But see id. at 30-31 (noting usefulness ofuniform measurement
systems to long-range commerce among strangers). See also id. at 49, 56 (relating simplified
land map in North America to arrival of new immigrants).
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ofnorms that makeproperty moreuseable and transferablefor everyone, even
44at the cost of occasional losses to those who fail to take heed.
I stress these minor and little-discussed "housekeeping" divestments
becausethey suggest that theproperty owner is not simply theholder ofrights
inabsolutedominion, tothe exclusionofall theuniverse, as somefamous lines
ofBlackstone's suggest-lines, I should say, that arefrequently quoted out of
context.' and without regard for Blackstone's own severe qualifications.4S
Propertyrights arerather subjectto somesystem-managementrules, rules that
require the property owner to take some responsibilities and bear some risks
attributable to the smooth functioning of the larger property regime. A
smoothly functioning property regime makes everyone better off, even if, on
occasion, the operations of its management rules result in the forfeiture of
individual formal rights.
To be sure, one way to look at these housekeeping constraints is to say
that they do not really take away anyone's property, but are rather conditions
and duties built into property itself. But this, ifanything, makes thepoint even
more sharply-that property includes an implicit set of conditions about
expropriation. Aregimeofpropertyrights-especially commercially available
property rights like most of our own-has its own central imperatives of
transparency and simplicity so that users can trade safely. In turn. those
imperatives result not only in the protection of rights, but also in their
qualification and adjustment, even though this includes some measure of
expropriation.46
I should pause here to mention what may seem an obvious parenthetical
point: it is not at all a trivial matter that these housekeeping rules attract little
attention and remain reasonably stable in the United States, as they also do in
many other countries. On the contrary, it is a very considerable achievement
to havereached a state of relative calm and quiet about suchmatters, where it
is simply assumed that we can enjoy a large measure of property protection,
modified almost invisibly by the adjustments necessary for simplicity,
legibility, andthe avoidance ofobsolescence. Anobvious comparisoncouldbe
made with the condition of Russia in its post-Soviet days: much economic
4SSee Carol M. Rose, Canons ofProperty Talk, or, Blackstone's Anxiety, 108 YALE L
J. 601, 601-02, 604-05 (1998) (noting that many property scholars quote Blackstone's lines
without noting qualifying language that immediately follows).
46See Robert C. Ellickson,Adverse Possession and Perpetuities Law: Two Dents in the
Libertarian Model of Property Rights, 64 WASH. U. L.Q. 723, 736-37 (1986) (noting
efficiency reasons for sacrificing formal rights where transactions costs become high and
arguing that "the deep structure ofproperty law has traditionally been not libertarianism, but
transaction-cost utilitarianism").
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uncertainty there has arisen from the inability of legal and governmental
institutions toprovidestableandpredictablebackgroundrules. 1bismeans that
ordinary transactions have been in a state of constant tunnoi1; it means that
people have to worry that their business deals won't stick; it means that they
cannot make credible legal commitments to other people, so that others will
trust them in their business relationships.47 It means that people have only
limited ways to publicize their property claims; and, in turn, lenders and
purchasers cannot be certain that there are no prior claims on a property, or
that. they themselves can take priority over later claims-an uncertainty that
can dry up investment.48 It means that some properties have been so loaded
with overlapping claims that they cannot beused at all.49 Itmeans that inmany
commercial transactions, creditors have to fall back on informal, even illegal,
enforcement-which all too often means the Mafiya, or criminal gangs, who
extract a highprice for their enforcement activities.50 The greatest fear should
be that once these gangs get a foothold, and once they take over the enforce-
ment tasks that the courts should be performing, the gangs will not let go.
But the point I wish to stress is that the very nature of a property regime
demands that property be stable only relatively, not absolutely. In turn, this
means that expropriation itself is a relative term. For that reason, it begs the
question to condemn "takings" of property as such. The lesson of Type I
divestments, those that occur in everyday property transactions, is that some
expropriations are not only acceptable but necessary to the operations of a
'"See, e.g., STBPHENHANoEIMAN, COMRADBCRIMINAL:RuSSIA'sNBWMAFlYA 68-70
(1995) (describing difficulties ofordinaryprivate business dealings, created by collaboration
ofcriminal and bureaucratic elements); cf. Paul Collier and Jan Willem Gunning, Explaining
AfricanEconomic Peifonnance, 37 J. BeaN. LIT. 64, 98-99 (1999) (noting that some African
governments' criminalization of market activities increased costs of contract enforcement
because courts were unavailable, resulting in reduced credit and capital flight).
48For Russia's new land registration system and some of its problems, see Lev S.
Batalov, TheRussian TitleRegistrationSystemforRealty andIts Effect on Foreign Investors,
73 WASH. L REv. 989, 1005-06, 1011-12, 1014-16 (1998) (noting continuation of
unregistered claims, severe constraints on publicity of registered claims and resultant
uncertainty for investors). For an interesting historical comparison, see Phillip T. Hoffman,
Gilles Postel-Vinay, and Jean-Laurent Rosenthal, Infonnation and Economic History: How
the Credit Market in Old Regime Paris Forces Us to Rethink the Transition to Capitalism,
104 AM. HISTORICAL REv. 69, 79-80 (1999) (observing that risks to creditors from lack of
effective land registration forced lenders to turn to middlemen "notaries" for information
about borrowers).
49See Michael A Heller, The Tragedy ofthe Anticommons: Property in the Transition
FromMarx to Markets, 111 lIARv. L REv. 621, 623-24 (1998) (describing how overlapping
claims can freeze property usage).
soSee Handelman, supra note 46, at 59-72 (describing entrepreneurs' inability to do
business without criminal assistance).
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property regimeitself. Thereal questionis not expropriation vel non; it is what
kinds of expropriations are appropriate to our constitutional system of
property, which are not, and why.
IT. TYPE IT DISRUPTIONS: REGULATORY ADJUSTMENTS
A second_ category of property rights disruptions includes far more
controversial matters. This category includes instances in which property is
affectedby regulatory changes-changes that in somemeasure alter the scope
and content ofproperty rights.
During the last few years in the United States, there has been a very
heated debate over the implications of regulatory changes on property rights.
This debate has followed the growth of environmental law, which some
property rights groups contend deprives owners oftheir property, particularly
property in land.51 Their view of environmental law is that this kind of
legislation is an example of what can go wrong in democracies: democratic
governments are all too prone to takeover by factions, who disrupt property
rights for the sake of some purported public project.52 While this argument is
basically libertarian, based on a natural rights view ofproperty, the utilitarian
argument lurks nearby. This is perhaps most visible in the best-known
exposition of the property rights position, Richard Epstein's Takings, which
explicitly mixes libertarian and utilitarian rationales.53 Under the utilitarian
view, of course, ifproperty owners are not secure in their expectations, they
will invest less effort, and the result will be some degree of social impoverish-
SIFor some quite different perspectives on this debate and its relation to environmental
law, see Douglas T. Kendall & Charles P. Lord, The Takings Project: A CriticalAnalysis and
Assessment a/the Progress So Far, B.C. ENvr'LAFF. L. REv. 509, 509-13 (1998) (arguing
that modern property rights debate stems from systematic and narrowly-based conservative
attack on environmental law). See generally WILLIAM A FIsCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS:
LAw, EcONOMICS, AND POLITICS 88-99 (1995) (arguing thatrecentattention topropertyrights
exemplifies longstanding cyclical pattern ofoscillation between public demands and private
property protection).
S2See, e.g., Editorial, The Environmental Aristocracy, WASHINGTON TIMEs, Dec. 29,
1996, at B2 (describing "elitist" extension of environmental regulation); Environmental
Conservation Organization, Colliding with Freedom (Column 285-99) at
<http://www.eco.freedom.orglcol/?i=I999/5> (describing idea ofsustainable development as
"on a collision course with Sustainable Freedom," comparing to a once "wildly popular"
scheme ofHitler's); see also Kainen, supra note 18, at 94-96 (describing modern scholarly
concerns about democratic regulation ofproperty).
S3See RICHARD A EpSTEIN, TAKINGS: PIuvATE PROPERTYAND TlIEPOWER OF EMINENT
DOMAIN 5 (1985) (asserting that libertarian and utilitarian arguments converge for limited
state intervention into property).
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ment. Given such concerns not only for liberty but for general social wealth,
it is important to ask more closely why property, and especially landed
property, is subject to changes in regulation.
When people have prope,rty rights in land, they also have access to other
resources that they in fact share with other people. That is, if you have land,
you alsohave access to air, water, and wildliferesources, whichnormally cross
the property boundaries ofa number ofowners.54 Whenever a landowner uses
any of these common-pool resources, the effects are not corrfmed to that
landowner's property. IfBart burns trash in the back yard, the smoke is likely
to travel through the air and across his property lines to Lydia's house and
beyond. When he pipes wastewater to a river or allows construction runoff to
flow into thestream, thatmaterial flows onto someoneelsedownstream. When
he logs trees that birds use for nests, he may contribute to an explosion of
insects somewhere else in a place where the birds normally eat the insects.
Such incidental uses of attached 'common resources are what the
economists call externalities, or spillover effects, or sometimes, as the
economist GaryLibecap has noted, commonpool losses-that is, actions from
which onepersonreaps thebenefits, while feeling none or only a small portion
ofthe costs.55 Spillover or commonpool effects do not matter very much when
there are few people and their uses ue not intensive. Air currents disperse
small amounts ofmost pollutants harmlessly. Flowing water does the same to
organic wastes. If only a few nesting sites are lost for a particular bird
population, no one will notice so long as lots of nesting trees remain standing
elsewhere. Under such circumstances, it is not worth the effort to constrain
people's uses oftheir property, or to redefine their rights more circumspectly;
the spillover effects simply do not matter enough.
But such spillovers matter very much indeed when there are many more
such users of common resources, or more intense uses, so that the common
resources become congested. One coal lIfe means nothing for London's air. A
few million coal fires can mean a killer smog-that is, the smog literally kills
a number of people in the short run, and contributes to long-range higher
mortality in many others.56 One coal-burning utility produces sulphur dioxide
that may disperse harmlessly; but with one hundred coal-burning utilities,
S4SeeCarolM. Rose, PropertyRights andResponsibilities, in THINKING ECOLOGICALLY:
THENEXT GENERATION OF ENVIRONMENTALPOUCY 49,51 (Marian R. Chertow and Daniel
C. Bsty eds., 1997) (discussing public rights in common resources).
sSSee GARY D. LmECAP, CONTRACTING FOR PROPERTY RIGHTS 1-2 (1989) (exploring
hypothetical economic agent mitigation of common pool losses).
S6See WILLIAM WISE, KIu.ER SMOG: THE WORLD'S WORST AIR POLLUTION DISASTER
passim (1968) (describing deadly London smog of1952, due especially to household soft coal
furnaces).
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sulphur dioxide may comes down as acid rain and can kill fish and trees
hundreds of miles away.57 The first auto in Los Angeles is unlikely to have
created discernible health problems due to air pollution, but when autos are
multipliedbymillions, their exhausts contributetodeadlyrespiratoryproblems
and heart disease.58 Such damages explain why certain coal fires werebanned
in London as far back as the early 14thcentury,59 why the Clean Air Act has
pushed utilities to cut their sulphur-burning coal,GO and Why California's
pollution control plan requires Los Angeles to reduce very substantially the
pollution levels from autos.61
Noticeherethat thechangingregulationofexternalities serves exactly the
samepurposethat theutilitarianstory gives for propertyitself: encouragingthe
efficient, careful and socially wealth-m1lximizinguse ofresources. Changes in
regulatory regimes do not occur smoothly, however. Just as it is characteristic
ofenvironmental problems that they are scarcely problems at all whenthefirst
spillovers occur-that is, with the first coal fire or the first aut~so is it
characteristic that we do not even notice the problems until spillover effects
STSee U.S. ENVT'L PROTECTION AGENCY, ACID RAIN PROGRAM, ENvIRONMENTAL
EFFEcTs OF ACID RAIN (last modified Apr. 1, 1999) (<http://www.epa.gov/acid
rainleffects/envben.html (describing effects of acid rain and benefits of control); William K.
Stevens, Study ofAcid Rain Uncovers a Threat to Far Wider Area, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 16,
1990, at C4 (describing effects ofacid rain in Northeast thought toresult from pollution from
Midwest utilities).
sSSee JAMES E. KRmR & EDMUND URSIN, POLLUTION AND POllCY: A CASE EssAY ON
CALIFORNIA AND FEDERAL ExPERIENCE WITH MOTOR VmnCLE AIR POLLUTION 1940-1975
18-20,80 (1977) (explaining sources and effects of air pollution).
S9See 1J. U.NEF, THERIsE OFTHEBRITISHCOALlNDUSTRY 157 (1966) (describing ban
on coal to limeburners in Southwark area in 1307). According to Nef, coal-burning and coal
fumes became more much more intense as forest supplies ofwood dwindled in the sixteenth
century. See id. at 12-13. In 1578, Queen Elizabeth apparently avoided London because of
the "noissome smells" ofcoal, and a varietyofother coal-burning uses were prosecuted in the
seventeenth century, though the smog-producing fires continued to distress Londoners. See
id. at 156-58; see also William H. TeBrake, AirPollution and Fuel Crises in Preindustrial
London. 16 TEcH. & CULTURE 337, passim (1975) (describing history of coal pollution,
particularly as result of medieval and early modern destruction of woodlands); Wise, supra
note 55, at 17-31 (describing earlyhistory ofLondon's smog and early efforts to control coal-
burning).
60See Clean Air Act Amendments ofl950, §§ 401-16, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7651-7651 (1994).
61See U.S. ENVT'LPRoTECTIoN AGENCY, EPA REGIoN 9; BREATHING EAsIER 1996:
OZONE (lastmodified May15, 1997) <http://www.epa.govlregion09/air/breath96/03.html>
(noting that greatest smog reduction 1980 to 1995 in region including California occurred in
California's south coast Air Basin).
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havebecomequiteintense.62 Unfortunately, bythattime, propertyowners have
often settled into thinking that their property rights include the externality-
causing activities. Take our friend Bart. Suppose Bart buys some waterfront
property: he may look around at the neighbors and observe that they filled in
their wetland areas years ago, and he may then claim that he shouldbe able to
develop in just the same way that they did-even though additional fill now
will result in flooding downstream. Or perhaps Bart thinks he should be able
to build a jetty out in the sea to preserve a little bit of beach for himself, just
the way the neighbors did, even though this activity reduces the total amount
ofsand for everyone and slightly devalues all thebeachfront properties. Or he
may think that he should be able to burn trash in the back yard, particularly if
hehas built a cinder-blockincinerator'for thepurpose. After all, his neighbors
have done this for years. From Bart's point of view, regulatory coilstraints on
the scope ofhis expected property are expropriation, pure and simple.
But as we learn from Type I disruptions, expropriation is not such a
simple matter. In theTypeI scenario, someexpropriationis built intoproperty
regimes as a housekeeping matter, for the sake of the transparency and
publicity ofproperty rights. The Type II disruptions also cut backonproperty
rights, for a different reason, but one that is also part and parcel ofproperty as
a resource management tool: property rights have to be redefined in order to
manage increasing congestion and common pool losses.
Theunderlying problemraising TypeII disruptions is that of transitions.
Earlier definitions ofproperty rights may treat air, water, and wildlife as free
goods, but in practice little harm is done, since thin uses of those resources
may causeonly negligible damageto air, water and wildlife-thefirst building
in the floodplain causes little harm, and the first coal-burning electrical plant
scarcely affects the wider air mantel. But later, additional floodplain buildings
may cause flooding downstream, while additional electrical plants create a
smokethat kills trees 500 miles away. Notice that bothtypes ofevents damage
theproperty ofotherpeople. Morecarefulregulationredefines propertyrights,
not only to protect health and safety, but also precisely in order to protect
property itself. The problem is that by the time we get around to regulating
floodplain building or coal fires, the new regulation upsets people's expecta-
tions about the ways they can use their property.
67.See, e.g., Wise, supra note 55, at 37-38, 48-49 (describing failure of 19th centmy air
pollution control in London due to lack ofprecise knowledge of damage from pollution) and
(same for Belgian killer fog in 1930); Krier & Ursin, supra note 57, at 48-54 (describing Los
Angeles' slowresponse to autopollution and tendency to blame air qualityproblems on small
and localized targets like synthetic rubber plant).
HeinOnline -- 2000 Utah L. Rev. 19 2000
No.1] PROPERTY AND EXPROPRIATION 19
Taken together, these considerations create what I call the Utilitarian
Dilemma, a dilemma that underlies many ofthe claims that property has been
unconstitutionally taken. The dilemma is that the essential goal of securing
property expectations clashes with the equally essential goal of managing
congested resources. Notice that as with the Type I disruptions, Type II
problems pit the stability of property owners expectations against the
imperatives ofthe property regime's own logic. Just as existing formal rights
may be disrupted by property's essential housekeeping, so may those rights
require redefinition when property regimes have to manage finite and
increasingly congested resources.
Unlike Type I disruptions, however, Type II disruptions are not so
randomly distributed, and this leads to several conundrums. Procedurally,
legislatures are the bodies effectively redefining rights, but as a number of
commentators have argued, legislatures may be tempted to single out more
vulnerable individuals to bear the onus of uncompensated change.63 This
patternmay leadnot only to inegalitarian decisions but to unwise ones, insofar
as legislatures may be cavalier about expenses that only appear on someone
else's budget (the "fiscal illusion" problem).64 Onthe otherhand, ifall changes
were uniformly compensated, property owners might be encouraged to take
unwise or strategic decisions oftheir own, safe in the knowledge that they will
be compensated (the ''moral hazard" problem).65
There is another problem, too. Completely uniform redefinitions might
conceivably "zip back" property rights across theboard, as Robert Nozickput
it, putting all owners on the same footing with respect to their property uses.66
But if they did so, regulations would tend to fall very hard on existing uses,
withtwo unfortunate effects. First are the economic consequences: this kind of
regulatory change could be particularly expensive, either wasting already-
63The classic statement is found inAnnstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)
(saying thatpurpose ofTakings Clause is "to barGovernmentfromforcing somepeople alone
to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a
whole"). The classic article on the subject is Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility and
Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of"Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARv. L.
REv. 1165,1216-17 (1967) (arguing thatowners are especially"demoralized" at theprospect
of being singled out by political majorities). Academic literature on this subject is
voluminous; for an extensive review of the existing writings from a variety ofperspectives,
see Fischel, supra note 50.
64SeeFischel, supra note 50, at 206, and sources cited therein (explaining fiscal illusion
concept).
6SSee Fischel, supra note 50, at 158-59 (describing moral hazard problem).
66RoBERT NOZICK ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA 176 (1974) (describing how in
Lockean theory of acquisition, scarcity late in acquisition process could "zip back" to affect
earliest acquisitions).
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committed resources or necessitating costly tear-downs or retrofit.67 Second,
and in part for that reason, "zipping back" the rights of pre-existing invest-
ments could seem particularly unfair and demoralizing.68 But on the other
hand, exemptions for existing uses have fairness and efficiency problems of
their own: onthefairness front, they canraisecharges offavoritism; and onthe
efficiency front, they can encourage premature development.69
Hence, while Type I rights-disruptions simply sacrifice formal property
claims randomly to the imperatives oftheproperty regime, TypeII disruptions
are not so random; they are rather shot through with countervailing consider-
ations, withrespect both to fairness and efficiency. That is the general context
in which the "takings" question arises, and with all these cross-currents,
perhaps it should be no surprise that, as many commentators have noticed,
takings decisions in the courts have a rather chaotic quality, using that term in
the now-fashionable sense of chaos theory.70 Perhaps because of this chaotic
context, thehistoric takings patterninthe courts, includingtheSupremeCourt,
has been to compromise. Moreover, like other phenomena studied by chaos
theory, the takings compromise has some ascertainable and regularly re-
appearing components.
What aretheserecurring components oftakings compromises? Generally,
the courts have looked for solutions that allow necessary regulation to go
forward, in order to redefine the scope of property rights in the face of
increasing congestion; but they have also tried to salvage the expectations of
property owners who are particularly caught short. In the mid 1970's, the
Supreme Court used a phrase that is now quoted a great deal: an owner cannot
succeed in a takings claim unless she can show that a regulatory change
fJ1See David A Dana, NaJural PreservaJion and theRace to Develop, 143 U. PA.L REv.
655,685 (1995) (noting high costs of undoing existing development).
68According to some cognitive psychologists, people are apt to feel the loss of an
existing "endowment" especially strongly. See, e.g., Jack L. Knetsch, The Endowment Effect
andEvidence ofNonreversible Indifference Curves, 79 AM. ECON. REv. 1277, passim (1989)
(describing experiments in which subjects' preferences were affected by possession).
69See Dana, supra note 66, at 684-93 (describing developers' incentives to develop
where developed land is not retroactively regulated).
7llpor the messiness of takings decisions, see, e.g., Michael A Heller and James E.
Krier, Deterrence and Distribution in the LawofTakings, 112 HARv. L. REv. 997, 1023-24
(1999) (describing Supreme Court decisions as turning doctrine into a "cryptogram"
decipherable onlyby temporary Courtmajorities). On chaos theory and its more general legal
ramifications, see Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Chaos and the Court, 91 COLUML REv. 110, 116
(1991) (arguing that chaos theory casts doubt on the possibility of predicting judicial
decisions).
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disrupts her "investment-backed expectations.'m What the courts seek is a
signal that a particular property owner really has been especially damagedby
a new regulation, and, in particular, that the owner has sunk capital on the
basis of a previous regulatory regime.
Somewhat akin to compensation based on "investment-backed expecta-
tions" arethe collectionofexceptions that courts andlegislatures have worked
out for special hardship cases. State courts in particular have developed
doctrines of "vested rights," generally applied when some combination of
owner investment and official approval are deemed sufficient to shield a
property owner from later uncompensated regulatory rollback of already-
initiateddevelopment.72 Courts have also insistedthatregulations includewhat
havecometobecalled "variances"-exceptions to general regulations that are
made for special hardship cases, at least where the exception poses no great
threat to the essential regulatory scheme.73 In modern environmental law, the
regulators rather than the courts have sometimes worked out similar kinds of
exceptions. For example, the Clean Water Acf4 forbids owners from filling in
wetlands areas without a federal permit, but enforcement agencies makes
routineexceptions for owners ofsmall plots.7s This is a compromise that takes
into account that smallholders may behurt proportionally more grievously by
limitations on fill, that their fill activities may be only minimally disruptive,
and that the administrative costs of enforcement may be especially high for
them.
Finally, a common though not universal pattern in property re-definition
is "grandfathering": that is, pre-existing uses may be wholly or partially
exempted from regulations even though they are not in conformity with new
regulations. This is particularly the case wherepre-existing nonconforming
uses normally are either likely to die out over time-as with older automobiles
71Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). The phrase
appeared originally in Michelman, supra note 62, at 1213.
72See, e.g., Clackamas Countyv. Holmes, 508 P.2d 190, 192-93 (Or. 1973) (describing
tests of vested rights to continue development).
73The classic case advancing this theory is Nectow v. City ofCambridge, 277 U. S. 183,
188 (1928). The United States Department of Commerce's Standard State Zoning Enabling
Act (1926) incorporates variances in the appeals process from zoning decisions. See A
Standard State Zoning Enabling Act (Advisory Comm. on Zoning, U.S. Dep't ofCommerCe,
recommended 1926), reprinted in American Law Inst., MODELlAND DEY. CODE, app. A, at
218 (Tentative Draft No.1, 1968); see also ROBERT C. ELuCKSON & A DAN TARLOCK,
lAND-USE CONTROLS 214 (1981) (describing variance proceedings).
74See 33 U.S.C. § 1344(c)7,F (1994).
7SSee Army Corps of Engineers, Nationwide Permit Program, 33 C.F.R. Pt. 330, App.
A, sec. 26 (describing routine "nationwide permit" for dredge and fill of areas under ten
acres) (repealed 1997).
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that are not required to install catalytic converters--or where someregulatory
moratorium is built in to deal with them, as in the so-called amortization
schemes in land use controls. Grandfathering has many problems from the
perspectiveofefficiency, most notably that thepracticeofregulating newuses,
while leaving old ones alone, may discourage innovation or encourage
prematuredevelopment.76 Deployedjudiciously, however, limited concessions
to pre-existing uses have some arguments in their favor: fIrst, they implicitly
recognize the special expense of retrofit; and second, more subtly,
grandfatheringcalibrates ownership rights accordingtotheincreasing marginal
cost ofnew development or new uses where resource congestion is rising. And
finally, grandfatheringreflects awidespreadrejectionofretroactiveregulation;
indeed, grandfathering is akin to takings compensation, in that it makes
allowances for property owners' demonstrated expectations and commit-
ments-expectations and commitments that were formed at a time when
regulatory change was not yet on the horizon.
Fromthesedoctrines and devices, one canseetheelements ofa traditional
and persistent compromise. The logic ofmanaging congestion may include an
elementofdivestment, in the sense that regulation redefines propertyrights; on
thewhole, our legal institutions haverequired that property owners adjust their
ownexpectations to incorporate theregulatory changethat is apartofthelogic
of managing scarce resources. But somewhat like doctrines of estoppel,
compensation or grandfathering softens the expropriative elements of
regulatory change where an owner would suffer special injury, where existing
investments were made when the marginal costs of common pool losses were
low, or whereexistinginvestments might go entirely towastewithoutoffsetting
social gains.
Those elements of adjustment comprise the historic pattern of takings
compromises. Compensation and exemptions have been imperfect and messy
as a matter of doctrine, as compromises often are; but they aim at balancing
securityofproperty over against the need to readjust the content ofthoserights
in theface ofcommonpool losses. TheSupremeCourthas beentaking a much
more activerole in these cases inrecent years, but on the whole those decisions
76See, e.g., Louisiana Envtl. Action Network v. United States Envtl. Protection Agency,
172 F.3d 65, 67 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (describing EPA variance regulation that recognizes string-
ent regulation ofnew waste disposal could give incentive to leave old wastes in place); Peter
Huber, The Old-NewDivision in RiskRegulation, 69 VA.L. REv. 1025,1025-28,1066,1073
(1983) (arguing that while regulating new risks more stringently than old is politically
feasible, pattern may discourage innovation and overall risk reduction); Dana, supra note 66,
at 682-86 (describing how nonn against retroactive legislation encourages premature
development).
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do not deviate far from this pattern, despite their sometimes troublesome
verbiage.77
The main points that I want to make about this category of property
divestments-that is, the divestments of regulatory transitions-are the
following: First, like Type I housekeeping adjustments, Type II regulatory
adjustments are a part of the logic of a property regime. Just as a property
regimemust includemechanisms thatkeep property relations relatively simple
andlegible, so does itneedregulatorymechanisms thatreadjustpropertyrights
in the face of changing resource congestion. As different parts of the logic of
propertyregimes, bothkinds ofmechanisms necessarilymodify existingrights.
But second, Type II divestments divergefrom TypeI. They areless likely
to be random than Type I divestments, and this feature raises questions both
offairness and efficiency, questions that are only seldom asked with respect to
TypeL Seenin thebig picture, TypeII problems begininthecontext ofneeded
response to long-range changes in resource congestion, but seenin the smaller
picture, theburdens of regulatory change may well not be evenly or randomly
distributed. And because ofthis distributional lumpiness, and thepartisanship
and self-interest it elicits, all kinds ofthings.may go wrong: fiscal illusion and
majority misrule on the side of government; moral hazard and destructive
evasions on the side oflandowners.
Those potentially damaging factors call for second-guessing and
compromise solutions to Type II issues, and our takings jurisprudence is one
oftheseverallocations inwhichwetakethosesecondguesses and workout the
contours of the compromises. It is not the only location by any
means-legislatures are engaged in similar compromises-but the courts are
animportant siteatwhichthediscussionofcompromiseenters our legalunder-
77For an interesting discussion ofthe divergence between the Supreme Court's rhetoric
(the "ApparentModel") and its actual decisions in thepropertyarea (the "OperativeModel"),
see Laura S. Underkuffler-Freund, Takings and theNature ofProperty, 9 CAN. J.L. &JURIS.
161, passim (1996). Underkuffler-Freund's article focuses on Lucas v. South Carolina Coast-
al Commission, 505 U.S. ~003 (1992), which held that a regulation was a "taking" if it
removed all beneficial economic use of the property. See id. at 174-75, 194-202. The actual
impact of the Lucas case is somewhat uncertain because of its idiosyncratic posture; the
appeal did not contest a lower court finding that the regulation did remove all beneficial
economic use, a context that distinguishes almost all other cases in which owners claim that
regulation effectively "takes" their property. Nevertheless, the rhetoric of Lucas-what
UnderRuffler-Freund calls the "apparentmodel"-suggests a quite untraditionalrigidityabout
property. See id. at 190. For example, the case suggests that regulation may not exceed
common law nuisance or ignore historic regulatory responses to changes in collective needs.
See id. at 190; see also Louise A Halper, Why the Nuisance Knot Can't Undo the Takings
Muddle, 28 IND. L. REv. 329, 336-39 (1995) (arguing Lucas ignores traditional nuisance
doctrine's recognition of legislative role).
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standing of property. But in general, the compromising approach to Type II
divestments underscores thepoint that whileTypeII regulatory disruptions are
akin to Type I housekeeping losses, they are also different.
This brings me to thelast ofmy expropriations types, Type III. These are
revolutionary expropriations. As withthe discussion ofType I expropriations,
I return here to an exposition ofcontrasts, that is, to reflect on another type of
expropriation that illuminates Type II by putting it in relief. But here the
contrast goes to the far end of the spectrum from Type I's everyday
divestments, those that go unnoticed because they are so routine. Instead, with
Type III, I turn to expropriations that are extraordinarily public and searingly
controversial, expropriations that in a sense draw the lines around a whole
community, and define who is in and who is out.
III. TYPE III: REVOLUTIONARY EXPROPRIATIONS
However much we Americans think of ourselves as property-conscious,
wehavein fact had a number ofextraordinary, evenrevolutionary, disruptions
of property rights. One of these came more or less simultaneously with the
American Revolution: when colonists loyal to Britain fled their homes, their
property was confiscated, and despite some diplomatic forays, the rather
meager compensation that the loyalists received came largely from Great
Britain rather than the new United States.78 A second extraordinary property
disruption in fact predated those Revolutionary confiscations, but the pattern
only cameinto sharp focus somewhat later. That was the expropriation ofland
from Native Americans.
Athird extraordinary disruption was the emancipation ofthe slaves inthe
aftermath of the Civil War in the l860s. Unquestionably, the institution of
slavery depended on a prior expropriation-that is, of the slaves' bodies from
themselves-a fact that certainly acted as a justification for emancipation.
Nevertheless, oncetheinstitutionofslavery was established, slaves represented
a substantial capital investment for their owners, who could and did argue that
uncompensated emancipation was an unconstitutional taking of their
78See, e.g., Richard D. Brown, The Confiscation and Disposition ofLoyalists' Estates
in Suffolk County, Massachusetts, 21 WM. & MARy Q. 534. 537-40 (1964) (describing
confiscation acts in Massachusetts, covering not only former royal officials, but also
absentees); Richard C. Haskett, Prosecuting the Revolution. 59 AM. RIST. REv. 578. 585-87
(1954) (describing confiscations in revolutionary New Jersey); RICHARD P. McCORMICK,
ExPERIMENTININDEPENDENCE:NEwJERSEYINTHECRITICALPERIOD,1781-1789.at26-27.
26, n.1, 31-35 (1950) (same); Robert S. Lambert, The Confiscation ofLoyalist Property in
Georgia, 1782-1786, WM. & MARy Q. 80, 81-85 (1963) (describing confiscations in
Georgia).
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property.79 In the later eighteenth and early nineteenth century, a number of
states inthe Northeast abolished slavery, but they did so with gradual schemes
that in effect compensated slaveowners at least partially for their losses.8o But
with the Civil War and thepost-War amendments to the Constitution, slavery
was simply abolished, and all capital investment in slaves wiped out.81
It is in this sense that, as Joseph Singer rightly implies, claims ofhistoric
Americanproperty-consciousness need to be taken with a large grain ofsalt.82
Quite aside from the mild Type I expropriations that are built into the
housekeeping management of property regimes, and quite aside from the
normal if more controversial regulatory changes that lead to Type II
redefinitions ofexisting property rights, on at least these three occasions (and
actually several more) we Americans have drastically altered property
relations.83
It is interesting to observe that the courts have played only a relatively
peripheralroleintwo outofthreeoftheserevolutionary expropriations, neither
79See ARTHUR ZiLVERSMlT, THEFIRST EMANCIPATION: THEABOUTION OF SLAVERYIN
THE NORTH 145 (1967) (discussing 1781 letter printed in New Jersey Gazette saying that
uncompensated emancipation deprived owners ofproperty in violation of constitution); see
also William Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding ofthe Takings Clause and the
Political Process, 95 COLUM. L. REv. 782, 851-55 (1995) (arguing that Madison believed
Takings Clause would protectproperty in slaves).
80See ZiLVERSMlT, supra note 78, at 199-200 (pointing out. that owners in New York's
and NewJersey's gradual emancipationlostno currentslaves and received considerablevalue
from retaining services of children born after emancipation).
81Section four ofthe Fourteenth Amendment forbade the federal and state governments
from compensating any claim deriving from the emancipation of any slave. See U.S. CONST.
amend. IV, §4.
82See Joseph William Singer, Sovereignty andProperty, 86 Nw. U. L. REv. 1,5 (1991)
(asserting thatmostAmerican real propertywas forcibly transferred fromNative Americans).
83Another example is the experience of the Japanese Americans who were evacuated
from the West Coast during World War II, losing considerable property to forced sale, theft,
and vandalism. See DILLON S. MEYER, UPROOTED AMERICANS: THE JAPANESE AMERICANS
ANDTHEWARRBLoCATIONAUTHORITYDURINGWORLDWARII, at245-56 (1971) (describing
losses in spite ofmeasures ofWar Relocation Authority to assist internees in managing their
property); see also REpORTOFTHECOMMISSIONONWARTIMERELOCATIONAND lNTERNMENT
OF CIVILIANS, PERSONAL JUSTICE DENIED 118-21 (2d ed. 1997) (describing inadequate 1948
statute for property compensation); LEsLIE T. HATAMIYA, RIGHTING AWRONG: JAPANESE
AMERICANS AND THE PASSAGE OF THE CIvIL LmERTIES ACT OF 1988, at 51, 57-58 (1993)
(describing passage of H.R. 442, 1987 statute for redress on personal rather than property
basis). Another example is the experience of the Mormon Church: an 1887 federal statute
dissolved the Church ofJesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints as a corporation and provided for
the escheat of its property to the United States, to be used for territorial schools. See Late
Corporation of the Church ofJesus Christ ofLatter-Day Saints v. United States, 136 U.S. .1,
65-66 (1890) (upholding statute).
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shaping nor reining in the incursions onproperty to any great degree, no doubt
because the surrounding circumstances were so charged with political and
militarily significance. State legislatures were the moving factor in the
Revolutionary seizures from loyalists, and while some confiscations required
a judicial finding of guilt, many did not even make that concession to judicial
process, as legislatures simplynamedtheattaintedpersons whosepropertywas
taken.84 Similarly, courts were relatively passivewith respect to the emancipa-
tion of slaves.85 An exception was Massachusetts, where the state courts
followed the lead of Lord Mansfield and opined that the state constitution
would not recognize slave status.86 But in other northern states, it was the
legislatures that passed the emancipation statutes, and it was the legislatures
as well that instituted a kind of piecemeal expropriation from slaveholders,
forbidding their courts from participating in the recapture of runaway
slaves-to the point that when Congress passed the Fugitive Slave Act of
1850, it created special commissioners to enforce it rather than relying on the
state COurts.87 For its part, the federal judiciary dutifully upheld property
claims in slaves and enforced the statutes that propped up those claims, much
84See, e.g., Brown, supra note77, at537-40 (explaining thatMassachusetts confiscation
legislation named certain notable persons as traitors, but left confiscations from mere
absentees to jury trial); Haskett, supra note 77, at 585-86 (explaining New Jersey
confiscations were initiated through county commissions, then heard by courts); Lambert,
supra note 77, at 82 (explaining that legislature declared certain persons guilty oftreason and
subject to confiscation). Interestingly enough, the courts had a more important role in later
claims made by persons claiming property through the wives and widows of loyalists; these
raised the question whether wives could act politically independently from their husbands.
See linda K. Kerber, The Paradox ofWomen's Citizenship in the Early Republic: The Case
of Martin vs. Massachusetts, 1805, 97 AM. H!sT. REv. 349, 358-62, 368-72 (1992)
(describing one such case).
ssSee ROBERT COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISlAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS
60-61,79-82,96-99 (1975) (reviewing genuine but very limited scope for emancipatory
activity in antebellum courts, through interpretation of state constitutional clauses,
manumission statutes, and comityrules); see also id. at 120-23 (describingjudges' own sense
of limitation).
86See ZrLVERSMIT, supra note 78, at 113-15; THoMAS D. MORRIS, FREEMEN ALL: THE
PERSONAL LmERTY LAws OF THE NORTH, 1780-1861, at 7, 13-14, 75 (1974) (describing
Massachusetts cases denying legalityofslaveryin the state and LordMansfield's opinion that
slavery could not be supported by English law); Lord Mansfield's opinion is contained in The
Case ofJames Sommersett, a Negro, on a Habeas Corpus, 20 State Trials 1, 82 (1772), ruling
that a slave brought into England had to be freed since slavery could only exist if supported
by positive law, which was not the case in England. See MORRIS, supra, at 13.
'!7See id. at 109-26 (describing "personal liberty laws"); see id. at 145-46 (describing
Fugitives Law Act of 1850).
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to the disgust of contemporary ethicists.88 And ofcourse, !bereally wholesale
expropriationfrom slaveholders-that is to say, emancipation-camewith the
CivilWar andthepost-CivilWar amendments, rather thanwithjudicialaction.
The courts played a much more prominent part, however, in defining and
delimitingtheexpropriations fromNativeAmericans. Thefoundationaljudicial
opinions are those of John Marshall in the early nineteenth century. The
Marshall opinions, to which I will return shortly, sharply constrained native
claims to property, and they are sometimes cited as examples of acute
ethonocentrism.89 Buttheynevertheless resistedsomeelements ofthewholesale
expropriations from tribal peoples that were already well underway, and in
recentyears theyhavebecomethelegal foundation for someimportantrevivals
of native claims. Still, at the time they were handed down, they proved
ineffectual as a means to halt the massive expulsions of native peoples from
their homelands.
The relatively peripheral role of the courts in two of the three of these
upheavals-either in furthering them or restraining them--suggests how
revolutionary these Type ill divestments were, and how little they were
integrated into the legal system, unlike Type I and Type ll. It is worthwhile to
pausehere to ask as well, why did thesemajor disruptions not also disrupt the
whole institution of property?90 All of these property revolutions entailed
88See William E. Nelson, The Impact oftheAntislaveryMovement on Styles ofJudicial
Reasoning inNineteenth-CenturyAmerica, 87HARv.L.REv. 513, 541-44 (1974) (describing
conflicting opinions regarding federal judicial role); ALFRED H. KELLYBr AL, 'IimAMERICAN
CONSTITUTION:ITS ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT 255-57 (6th ed. 1983) (describing opposing
receptions to Supreme Court's decision in Prigg v. Pennsylvania which upheld federal fugi-
tive slave act of 1793); MORRIS, supra note 85, at 173-85 (describing resistance to Fugitive
Slave Act in some state legislatures and courts). Cover, supra note 84 at, 238-56, uses the
experience of four antislavery judges to explore the particular moral dilemmas that slavery
presented for thejudiciary. For laterNineteenth centurycontemptfor earlierjudicialpassivity
about slavery, and for the later impact on the courts, see Nelson, supra, at 549-54.
89See, e.g., Robert A Williams, Jr., Sovereignty, Racism, Human Rights: Indian Self-
Detennination and the Postmodem World Legal System, 2 REv. CONST. STUD. 146, 172-73
(1995) (describingMarshall opinions model as foundation for "the continuing legacyofEuro-
pean-derived colonialism and racism"); Michael Asch & Normal Zlotkin, Affinning Abori-
ginal Title: A NewBasisfor Comprehensive Claims Negotiations, in ABORIGINALAND TREA-
TYRrGHTS IN CANADA: EsSAYS ONlAw, EQUAUI'Y, AND R£sPEcr FOR DIFFERENCE 208,223
(Michael Asch ed., 1997) (describing Marshall opinion as developing "colonial legal prece-
dents" showing "ethnocentric bias").
90At least in the case of the Tory confiscations, there was some contemporary concern
about just such disruption. See Richard B. Morris, Class Struggle and the American Revo-
lution, 19 WM. & MARY Q. 3, 6-7 (1962) (noting fears of American Whig leadership that
demands for confiscations ofLoyalistpropertymight bepartofmore general "leveling" attack
on property, though noting also that these fears did not materialize).
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massiveredistributions, justthesortofaction, according tothegreatUtilitarian
thinker Jeremy Bentham, that could makepeople distrust the ability ofthe law
to safeguardtheirproperty.91 Theeffect shouldhavebeenwhatBenthamcalled
"the deadening ofindustry": people would stop working and investing in what
they owned, fearing that it might all be taken from them.92 Why did this not
appear to happen? Why did not the very beneficiaries of these transfers fear
that their own property might be grabbed by someone else? Why, in short, did
these events not make all property seem insecure?
One answer is that these disruptions were worked on people who were
perceived to be nonmembers of the community: outsiders, outcasts, and
outlaws. During the Revolution, loyalists were perceived as betrayers to
American aspirations, and hence fair game.93 As to the slaveowners, there is
a telling difference between pre-Civil War emancipation efforts and those of
the wartime and postwar eras. In the prewar period, when several northern
states did abolish slave ownership by statute, it is significant that the most
difficult obstacles concerned compensation.94 For example, even where
emancipation was declared for newborns, the assumption was that the owners
ofthe still-enslaved mothers would have to be compensatedfor supporting the
mothers' children.95 The larger picture is clear: in the pre-war era, at least for
the majority oflawmakers, if not for abolitionists, it was simply assumed that
slaveowners' property could not be taken without compensation, however
immoral the institution of slavery itself.96 But once the war started,
slaveowning Southerners becamerebels, persons who tookup arms against the
United States, and this changed everything. The Emancipation Proclamation
91See BENTHAM, supra note 3, at 141-46.
92Id. at 142-44. Bentham specifically remarked that whatever evils might attend the
distributions ofpropertyunder serfdom or slavery, those distributions could not be overturned
without threatening the security of all property. See id. at 146-47.
93See, e.g., Brown, supra note 77, at 549-50 (quoting October 1778 letter of Samuel
Adams to James Warren, which describes loyalists as "traitors ... doing their utmost to
enslave and ruin uS,-shall these wretches have their estates reserved for them and
restored ... 1").
94See ZrLVERSMlT, supra note 78, at 175-84 (discussing New York's concerns over
compensation in 1790's debate); Claudia Dale Goldin, The Economics ofEmancipation. 33
J. ECON. RIST. 66,72-79 (1973) (describing costs of various emancipation options).
9SSee ZrLVERSMIT, supra note 78, at 121-22, 182-84, 192-93 (describing various
northern states' provisions for owners to retain services of children of slaves born after
emancipation date).
96See Goldin, supra note 93, at 73 (asserting thatmajorityofpopulation in 1860 thought
emancipation required compensation); Martin Duberman, TheNorthemResponse to Slavery,
in THE ANTISLAVERY VANGUARD: NEW EsSAYS ON ABOLITIONISTS 395, 397-99 (Martin
Duberman ed., 1965) (noting gradualism of most Northerners's antislavery views and
nervousness about direct abolition as attack on private property).
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itself formally applied only to rebellious areas, while exempting states heldby
theUnion;97 andindeed, slaveholders inUnion-held Kentucky still regardedthe
Proclamationas unconstitutional.98 Thus until theoutbreakofwar andbeyond,
emancipation continually raised property questions, in spite of the very
powerful Abolitionist arguments about the immorality of slavery. Emanci-
patory expropriation only became thinkable when war turned the matter into
a question ofWe versus They.
Hence in both cases, the Revolutionary confiscations and the slave
emancipations, radical expropriationgaverise tono demoralization among us,
because these appropriations only affected them. They were not members of
our moral and political community, and disruption of what they thought their
property was thus a matter of relative indifference. Disruption of such
outsiders' property seemedto carry verylittlethreat to theproperty ofinsiders.
Much the same attitude appears to have played out in the massive
expropriations from the American Indian tribes, but I wish to devote more
attention to these expropriations because of their more ambiguous legal
character. Theofficial legalpositionoftheUnitedStates disavowed expropria-
tion, to thepoint that in 1947, Felix Cohen, by no means a naifwith respectto
thehistory and condition of American native peoples, could proclaimthat the
United States was unique among nations in that it had acquired almost all its
public domain (excepting Alaska) by purchase from indigenous peoples.99
Nevertheless, there was another way in which native expropriationcould
be denied: there was no expropriation, some argued, because the native tribes
never had property at all. This theme ran back to the beginning of European
settlement, in spite of the fact that in the early days of settlement, when
"'.See ERIcFONER,REcoNSTRUCTION:AMERICA'SUNFINlSHEDREVOLUTION 1863-1867,
at 7 (1989) (noting exemption for Union territories, though also noting practical effect of
freeing many slaves there as well).
98See id. at 37 (noting that Kentucky, though Unionist, resisted emancipation and
opposed theThirteenth Amendment); VIcrORB. HOWARD,BLACKLmERATIONINKENTucKY:
EMANCIPATIONANDF'REEooM, 1862-1884, at 35-37 (1983) (Kentucky unionists considered
Proclamation unconstitutional); E. MERTON COULTER, THE CIVILWARAND READJUSTMENT
IN KENTuCKY 163-64, 258-61 (1926) (same); HOWARD, supra at 87-90 (same). As late as
1862, lincoln offered compensation to slaveowners if Kentucky would free the slaves. See
COULTER, supra, at 158. He made a similar offer to Maryland. See Charles L. Wagandt,
Redemption orReaction?-Maryland in the Post-Civil War Years, in RADICALISM, RACISM,
ANDPARTYRFAuGNMENT:THEBORDERSTATESDURINGRECONSTRUCTION 146, 149 (Richard
O. Curry ed., 1969).
99See FelixS. Cohen, OriginalIndian Title, 32MINN. L. REv. 28, 33-38 (1948). Cohen
excepted Alaska, but would probably include it now by virtue of the payments made under
the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act of 1971, Pub. L. 92-203, 85 Stat. 688 (codified at
43 U.S.C.A. §§ 1601 to 1629f) (West 1998».
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Europeans were relatively weak and few in number, they themselves regularly
purchased land rights from native tribes;l°O and indeed they continued to make
private land purchases from native peoples even after the Revolution, in spite
ofa 1790 federal statutemaking it illegal to do SO.101 Whatever thoseextensive
purchases migbthavesignifiedto thesettlerpurchasers, their argument against
nativeproperty was that, with the minor exception ofwomen's crop areas, the
Native Americans were too nomadic to hold property and too unwilling to
make the permanent improvements that would clarify their claims and give
them moral weigbt.102 It is now known that in fact, native practices did
considerably modify the landscape, particularly through the use of fire, which
cleared browse areas for grazing animals; the early European settlers
themselves were aware of this, and hence the claims about the nomadic and
unimproving character of native economies clearly protested too much.103
Nevertheless, European theorists amplified the arguments against the
supposedly nomadic indigenous people's property.104 Such arguments
undoubtedly came to seem more plausible to settlers as European diseases
lOOSee JOHNFREDERICKMARTIN, PROFITSINTHEWILDERNESS: ENTREPRENEURSHIPAND
THE FOUNDING OF NEW ENGLAND TOWNS IN THE SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY 10-18 (1991)
(describing how New England frontier settlements used services of professional settlement
entrepreneurs, who were accustomed to dealing with Native Americans both in land purchases
and in warfare).
lOlSee Indian Trade and Non-Intercourse Act, ch. 33, 1 Stat. 137 (1790) (obsolete).
According to the subsequent Act of 1793, no purchase or grant of land from any Indians or
tribes would be valid unless made under treaty. See Chapter 191 Stat. 329 (1793). Thefederal
government here followed the British example in the Proclamation of 1763, forbidding all
parties from engaging in land purchases from the Indians except under governmental auspices.
102See WIllIAM CRONON, CHANGES IN THE lAND: INDIANS, COLONISTS AND THE
ECOLOGYOFNEWENGLAND 62-63 (1983) (describing Puritan discussions ofIndian property
and limited recognition of Indian claims to women's agricultural plots).
I03See STEPHEN J. PYNE, FIRE IN AMERICA: A CULTURAL HISTORY OF WILDLAND AND
RURALFlRE47-51 (1982) (describing Eastern tribes use of fire); CRONON, supra note 101,
at 57-58 (concerning European knowledge of impact of native fire practices); Rosemary J.
Coombe, Authorial Cartographies: Mapping Proprietary Borders in a Less-Than-BraveNew
World, 48 STAN. L. REv. 1357, 1362 (1996) (observing European "insistence" on nomadic
character of native life despite evidence to contrary).
I04See S. JAMBS ANAYA, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 13, 16 (1996)
(describing eighteenth-century international law theorist Emerrerich de VatteI's extension of
Lockean theory and taking view that cultivation gave greater right to land than hunting or
gathering); ROBERT A. WIllIAMS, JR., 1HEAMERICAN INDIAN IN WESTERN LEGALTHOUGHT:
1HE DISCOURSES OF CONQUEST 2446-49 (1990) (describing how Locke's arguments about
Indians' lack of productivity and impact on colonists in eighteenth century) [hereinafter
"AMERICAN INDIANs"].
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disrupted native populations and social structures;105 as Anglo-Americans,
once freed from the checks of native tribes' alliances with European rivals,
movedmoreaggressively westward;106 and as tribal groups retreatedinto areas
occupied by other tribal peoples, where their economies in fact did probably
become more nomadic and less settled.107 All these factors helped to confirm
Anglo-American views that whatever claims native peoples had, they were
based on practices too ephemeral and too unsettled to count as property.
Arguments about the status ofIndianland claims made an appearance in
the United States' courts very early in the new republic's history in, among
others, the famous case of Fletcher v. Peck. lOS The litany against native
property appeared most particularly when the status of direct land purchases
from Native Americans came before the United States Supreme Court in
Johnson v. Mc'Intosh,109 the first of Marshall's trilogy on Native American
claims. lbis case concerned the legal status of a large amount oflandin what
was then considered theWest, now theupper Midwest. Theplaintiffs claimed
ownership through a direct purchase from representatives of several Indian
tribes.no The defendants' conflicting claim, ostensibly to the very same land,
derivedfrom a titlethat camelater intime, but that originateddirectly from the
United States, after the tribes had ceded the land to the United States without
any reservation or title.111
lOSSee A1.FRED W. CROSBY, EcOLOGICALIMPERJAIlSM:THEBrOLOGIcALExPANSrON OF
EUROPE, 900-1900, at 202-215 (1986) (describing ravages of European infectious diseases
among North American and other indigenous populations).
I06See Jeremy Adelman & Stephen Aron, From Borderlands to Borders: Empires,
Nation-States, and the Peoples in Between in North American History, 104 AM. RIST. REv.
814,822-23,828,835,838-41 (1999) (arguing that European nations' rivalries encouraged
alliances and peaceful relations with native tribes, but that American expansionism into
native areas grew more aggressive as Europeans rivals left).
H1TSee TerryL Anderson & Fred S. McChesney, Raid or Trade? An Economic Model
ofIndian-White Relations, 37 J.L & ECON. 39, 61-62, n.69 (1994) (comparing Eastern and
Western tribes and describing Western tribes as having less settled land claims due to greater
mobility of hunting, less agriculture, greater intertribal warfare).
10310 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810). Fletcher upheld western Georgian land sales that had
been induced by bribing legislators, but there was a subtheme on Native American claims:
one party argued that Georgia had not been seized in fee oflands subject to "Indian title," but
this claimwas put to one side with the assertion that whatever the property interests ofnative
tribes, those interests were not incompatible with the state's seizin. Id. at 142-43. See also
Nell Jessup Newton, At the Whim of the Sovereign: Aboriginal Title Reconsidered, 31
HAsTINGS LJ. 1215, 1~20-21 (1980) (discussing question of aboriginal title in Fletcher.)
109z.1 U.S. (8 Wheal) 543 (1823).
llOSee id. at 571-72.
lllSee id. at593-94.
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The defendants attacked the legality of the plaintiffs' direct private
purchase from native peoples, and in making that attack they questioned
whether the native peoples even had any property that they could have
conveyedto theplaintiffs.112 This portionofthe defendants' argument reflected
centuries ofdenial ofindigenous people's property. The Indians could not have
conveyed good title to land, said the Johnson defendants, because they never
owned it. First, Native Americans did not own property under the laws of the
United States, because the law ofnations, to which the United States adhered,
had nev.er accorded these peoples any permanent right in the soil.113 Second,
Native Americans could not ownland because their ownlaw did not recognize
property: "the Indians never had any idea of individual property in lands."114
But the third and most pointed argument was that the Native Americans
did not own this land according to what was called the law of nature.1IS Why
not? Because the Indians simply wandered over the land and hunted, and they
did so nonexclusively.116 These activities, according to the defendants, gave no
more claimto property than fishing in the sea.117 They did not makepermanent
changes in the land; they did not build fences, they did not do anything to
exclude others; and hence "the lands occupied by each tribe were not used by
them in such a manner as to prevent their being appropriated by a people of
cultivators.,,118 You cannot own something, on this argument, unless you show
your claim to the world; and you cannot do that unless you have some settled
agriculture or settled markers, and if your claims are nonexclusive and
unintensive, it is unjust to keep out those who would make more intensive and
productive use of the land. 119
Putting to one side the factual problems with this description of Native
American land uses,12O this argument is especially striking in the way that it
incorporates we/they thinking into property terms, or what in anthropological
112See id. at 567. No native peoples were party to Johnson, and under principles of res
judicata, the decision was not directly binding on tribal peoples. See Philip P. Frickey,
Marshalling PastandPresent: Colonialism, Constitutionalism, andInterpretation inFederal
Indian Law, 107 lIARv. L. REv. 381, 389-90 (1993).
113Johnson, 21 U.S. at 567-68.
114Id. at 568.
IIsSee id. at 569.
116See id. at 569-70.
ll1See id.
118Id. at 570.
119See id. at 568-70.
I20See llNDA S. PARKER, NATIVEAMERICAN EsTATE: THE STRUGGLE OVERlNDIAN AND
HAWAllANl..ANDs 19-23 (1989) (describing productive activities and land tenure systems of
Native Americans in East, Midwest and Southwest areas).
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discussions is sometimes referred to as "othering.,,121 Theiruses of resources
arenotproperty. Nomadic uses cannot constituteproperty, because they leave
no mark of exclusive claims. What is more, their uses are unproductive and
wasteful; they were merely hunting, doing pitiably little with the land.122 But
our land uses are agricultural, or timbering, or mining, and our uses would
bring great wealth from the earth. We deserve this land, they do not. This is of
course an argument that would never recognize anything like property rights
in the Indian tribes, or in any other nomadic peoples.123
In response to this, Justice Marshall did uphold the claims of the
defendants in Johnson, but he referred only obliquely to their argument from
the fundamental nature ofproperty (and the supposed unnaturalness ofIndian
property),I24 and turned instead to arguments from international law. By the
consensus ofEuropean nations, he asserted, "discovery" gave superior title to
the discovering nation; vis-a-vis oneanother, all wouldrecognizethe exclusive
right of a discoverer nation to deal with the native peoples of the lands they
respectively "discovered.'>l25England was the"discoverer" oftherelevantpart
ofNorth America, and the United States was its successor; this meant that the
United States alone was entitled to deal with native peoples' claims.126 And
sincetheUnitedStates, like all its predecessors inthis "pre-emptiveright," had
not authorized any entity but itself to extinguish native claims, the plaintiffs'
purportedpurchasefromtheIndiantribes was anullity inthelaw ofthe United
States.127
Marshall's "discovery" doctrine became well-known in the law of
indigenous peoples the world over,128 and it has been much derided as
12lSee, e.g." RebeccaR. French, OfNarra!ive in LawandAnthropology, 30 L. &SOC'y
REv. 417, 429 (1996) (quoting and discussing work of anthropologist Lila Abu-Lughod who
wrote on dangers of cultural separation and generalization).
l22Benthammighthave added that the native claimants' undefined boundaries and lack
of secure exclusive dominion invited warfare. See Bentham, supra note 3, at 145-46
(contrasting Native American and settler societies, describing former not only as poor but as
violent and warlike, and attributing peace and prosperity of latter to security of property).
lZSee Carol M. Rose, Possession as the Origin ofProperty, 52 U. CHI. L. REv. 73,87
(1985) (describing hostility of common law criteria to nomadic property claims).




l7JJSee, e.g., AMERICANlNDIANS, supra note 103, at289 (describing Johnson's influence
on indigenous rights in European settlements thereafter); Catherine Bell & Michael Asch,
Challenging Assumptions: the Impact of Precedent in Aboriginal Rights Litiga!ion, in
ABORIGINALAND 'TREATYRIGHfS INCANADA: EsSAYS ONUW, EQUALITY,ANDREsPECfFOR
DIFFERENCE 38, 45-46 (Michael Asch ed., 1997) (describing influence in Canadian
Aboriginal law).
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diminishing the rights of native peoples.I29 When tribal peoples themselves
appeared as parties before the Supreme Court, in Cherokee Nation v.
Georgia,130 they quite resoundingly denounced the discovery doctrine.I31 But
no native peoples were parties either to the Johnson case or to any agreement
among Europeans with respect to the fruits of "discovery"; and nothing in
Marshall's opinion held native peoples directly subject to an agreement in
which they had played no role. Instead, the diminution of their rights was
indirect, constricting the range ofpersons and nations with whom they might
deal. As Marshall articulated it, the discovery doctrine was the foundation of
a cartel agreement, though which the European nations divided the Americas
into what might now be called "exclusive territories.,,132 In setting out
"discovery" as a part of the law of the United States, Marshall implied that
Native Americans would have at most an incompleteproperty under that law,
since tribal peoples were effectively blocked from alienating their rights to any
party except the UnitedStates itself, or a party authorizedby theUnitedStates.
If native peoples' rights were "necessarily diminished," as Marshall put it, it
129See, e.g., Frickey, supra note 111, at 389 (arguing that Marshall opinion detracted
from native property claims); Raymond Cross, Sovereign Bargains, Indian Takings, and the
Preservation ofIndian Country in the Twenty-First Century, 40 ARlZ. L. REv. 425, 450-52
(1998) (same); Robert A Williams, Jr., supra note 88, at 163-64 (1995) (same). My own
view is that many critical readings of Johnson are misleading insofar as they understate the
point that the "discovery" doctrine--because it derived from an agreement among European
nations--could at most govern the relationships of the parties so agreeing, a point that
Marshall repeated in Worcesterv. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 544, 584 (1832). See Joseph
William Singer, Well-Settled?: The Increasing Weight ofHistory in American Indian Land
Claims, 28 GA. L. REv. 481, 490-93 (1994) (arguing that Johnson was aimed chiefly at
settling relations among European nations) [hereinafter "Land Claims"]. Thus the third-party
impact of this agreement on tribal nations was indirect, consisting of a limitation ofparties
with whom they could bargain. See Singer, supra; see also notes 123-26 and accompanying
text.
13030 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1,4 (1831).
J3JSee id. at 4 (stating Indian nation had never assented to doctrine of discovery as
affecting their rights, and denying its validity in positive or natural law).
J32Johnson, 21 U.S. at 573-74. This construction of the discovery doctrine--as an
agreement among the European nations alone--was repeated in Marshall's opinion in
Worcester, 31 U.S. at543-44. The cartel and exclusive territoryaspects ofJohnson's doctrine
of discovery are emphasized in ERIC KADES, THE DARK SIDE OF EFFICIENCY: Johnson v.
Me'Intosh AND THE ExPROPRIATION OF INDIAN LANDs 148 U. PENN. L. REv. 1065, 1110
(2000) (describing discovery doctrine as creating "monopsony" powers). See also Anderson
& McChesney, supra note 106, at 56 (same). The important new article of Adelman and
Aren, supra note 105, at 816, suggests that Indian territorial claims in fact had been treated
much more respectfully when there was greater competition among the settler countries to
form alliances with tribal groups.
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was becausethe discovery doctrine so sharply narrowed the set ofparties with
whom they might trade.133
ButMarshall declinedtheinvitationoftheJohnson defendants to saythat
Native Americans had no claims of entitlement whatsoever, and instead held
that thenativetribes had a right of"occupancy," which only theUnited States,
of course, could extinguish.l34 Although these occupancy rights were left
undefined. Marshall's strongimplication was that theUnitedStateshadto take
somepositiveaction, either through agreement or throughjustified war, before
Indian rights could be divested.135
InMarshall's defense, theposition ofJohnson was something ofa middle
ground. If Marshall had said that Native Americans had complete property
rights, including a right of alienation, they would almost certainly have been
subject to enormous pressure to sell by an ever-increasing numbers ofsettlers,
who were more than willing to use force and fraud to arrange the transfer of
landfrom tribal peoples to themselves.136 On the other hand. ifthedefendants'
arguments had been accepted. Indian claims would indeed have been nothing
at all. That was in fact the position that was taken by the courts in Australia
until late in the twentieth century. According to nineteenth century Australian
law, Australia was supposedly simply empty land. "terra nullius:' where the
aboriginal population was legally invisible;137 it is only within the last decade
that the Australian courts have revisited and rejected this position.138
Marshall did seem to think it futile for a court to try to halt the tide of
settlers pouring across the country, to the great detriment of the Native
Americans,139 but his opinion placed a legal buffer-the government of the
133Johnson, 21 U.S. at 574.
l34/d.
13sSee Newton, supra note 107, at 1220-26 (arguing that Marshall Court opinions
required deference by settling sovereign to aboriginal title).
136See Anderson &McChesney, supra note 106, at 64 (noting settlers' use ofviolence
and fraud in defiance of treaties); see also AMERICAN INDIANS, supra note 103, at 298
(describing how argument in favor ofnative propertyrights came from land speculators who
had purchased directly from natives). Newton, supra note 107, at 1223, also notes that an
absolute native property right would have the effect of disrupting numerous existing titles.
No doubt the latter could have lead to further violence among the settlers themselves.
I37HenryReynolds, Native TitleandHistoricalTradition: Past andPresent, inTHEAGE
OF MABO: HIsTORY, ABORIGINES AND AUSTRALIA 17, 18-19 (Bain Attwood ed. 1996)
(describing Australian legal tradition).
138See Mabo v. Queensland (No.2) (Austl. 1957) 175 L.L.R 1, 101-09 (Deone &
Gaudron, J.J.) (1992).
139See Frickey, supra note 111, at 388-90 (arguing that Marshall's opinion, while
raising a normative theme, instead stressed the themeofjudicial subordination to a colonizing
sovereign).
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United States-between Native Americans and the new settlers, ineffective
thoughthatbuffer may seeminretrospect. Johnson, as well as Marshall's later
opinion on Georgia's Cherokee removal statute, Worcester, clearly failed to
prevent the forcible displacement of native peoples throughout the nineteenth
century and beyond, much of it by the very federal government that Johnson
supposedly interposedas animplicitprotector. Many years later, eventhelegal
basis ofthatprotectionwas threatenedin amid-twentiethcentury casethathas
beensharplycriticizedfor misreading Johnson, Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United
States;140 in this case the Supreme Court ruled that the United States needed
not pay compensation for actions inconsistent with certain as-yet-
unextinguished native claims.141
Ontheotherhand, Johnson itselfhas becomesomething ofa timecapsule
in modern native claims issues. In an early salvo, the Penobscots and
Passamaquodies used Johnson's logic to sue the United States for failing to
protect them from the late eighteenth century onward from direct land
purchases by the state ofMaine, as well as by several privateparties; the case
was settled with a land transfer and cash payment.142 Even earlier, in the later
1960s, when significant amounts of oil were discovered onthe Alaskan North
Slope, theinterestedparties realized thatlittledevelopment couldproceeduntil
the incohate but as-yet-intact Alaska native occupancy rights were extin-
guished.143 Although the United States claimed no legal necessity to compen-
sate these indigenous peoples' claims, after lengthy negotiations Congress in
140348 U.S. 272 (1955).
141See id.. at 288-89 (concerning logging permits in a National Forest in Alaska, and
holding that United States did not have to pay "takings" compensation when it acted
inconsistentlywith unextinguished nativeoccupancyrights). Forcriticism, see Newton, supra
note 107, at 1220, 1246, 1252-53 (criticizing case as inconsistent with historic law); Land
Claims, supra note 128, at495-520 (same); John P. Lowndes, When History Outweighs Law:
Extinguishment ofAbenaki Aboriginal Title, 42 BUFF. L REv. 77, 95-98 (1994) (same; also
arguing that Tee-Hit-Ton has in fact been reconsidered in more recent cases, particularly
Oneida Indian Nation v. County ofOneida, 414 U.S. 661, 669-70 (1974)). See also Mabo,
175 C.L.R. at 90 (Dean & Gaudron, J.J.) (criticizing Tee-Hit-Ton's position as against the
"weight of authority" as well as contrary to "considerations of justice").
142See Joint Tribal Council of the Passamaquoddy Tribe v. Morton, 388 F. Supp. 649,
652-53 (D. Me. 1975), off'd, 528 F.2d 370 (1st Cir. 1975); settled by the 1980 Maine Indian
Claims Settlement Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1721-1735.
143See MARy CLAy BERRY, 1'HE ALASKA PIPELINE: 1'HE POLITICS OF On. AND NATIVE
lAND CLAIMs 109-23, 164, 247-48 (1975) (describing potential obstacles of native claims
to pipeline, oil companies' and legislators' reactions).
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fact accorded Alaska tribal groups a major cash and land settlement in the
Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act of 1971.144
None ofthis is to say that nativepeoples' property claims havebeeneven
remotely adequately addressed in the United States. But by recognizing even
an incohate "occupancy" right, the Johnson case did at least establish the
principle-however weakly executed in practice and however threatened in
modem judicial misreadings-that Native Americans are not some kind of
outlaw or enemy group, whose property claims count for nothing. Whatever
their scope, their claims too are a sUbject for consideration and negotiation
rather than simple confiscation.145
IV. CONCLUSION
It is time to return to the framing question: what do Type I and Type ill
expropriations teU us about the contentious Type II takings issues? Type I
disruptions show how certain kinds of expropriation are necessarily built into
a property regime; they make the regime itself function. Type ill disruptions
are at the other extreme: they are expropriations that occur not from the logic
of a property regime, but rather because some people, rightly or wrongly, are
not deemed to be participants in the property regime at all. At that extreme,
denial of property is denial of membership in a community; it is a part of a
radical othering.
The subject of my special concern, the Type II disruptions that raise
takings claims, partakes of the first but gives rise to the specter of the third
TypeII disruptions arise from theproperty adjustments that mustbebuilt into
a property regime, in order to cope with changes in congested resources; but
nevertheless, these adjustments can raise the prospect that some persons are
treated as strangers to the community. This may be one reason why takings
claims arouse suchheated emotions onthepart ofowners; it is not simply that
owners perceivetheloss ofa valuable asset, but also that they sensethat others
are saying, in effect, we can take your things and we don't care, because you
are not one ofus.
144See Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act of 1971, Pub. L. 92-203, 85 Stat. 688
(codified at 43 U.S.CA §§ 1601 to 1629f) (West 1998). For a brief history of the events
leading up to the act, see United States v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 F. Supp. 1009,
1017-1019 (D. Alaska 1977); see also H. Rep. No. 92-203, H. Rep. No. 92-523, 92d Cong.,
1st Sess., reprinted in U.S.C.C.AN. 2192-94 (disavowing legal necessity for United States
to compensate for extinguishment of native title, but referring to consistent practice of
providing land and fair value of titles extinguished).
1
4SSee Land Claims, supra note 128, at 531 (arguing that recognition of native claims
can be basis for negotiation and settlement).
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The understanding of takings issues as compromise, on the other hand,
can deflate these fears on the part of property owners, while reminding
legislatures that no members ofthe community canbe treated as nullities, even
in the process of making necessary adjustments. This is why I stress that our
takings jurisprudence can and should be seen as a series of compromise
devices, taking seriously the exigencies of the property regime taken as a
whole, but also taking seriously the claims ofparticular owners as participants
in that common regime.
Some expectations of .owners cannot be satisfied without making a
property regime fall apart from its own rigidity. But the object of Type II
property disruption is transitional; Type II regulations are not aimed at
punishing enemies or declaring war on outsiders, but rather at making
adjustments necessary to further the common wealth of the community. Our
takings jurisprudencehas to beseeninthat light, wherecompensationis neither
automatic nor automatically denied, but rather one element in a quest for
compromise solutions.
I have stressed in my own writings inthepast that a property regirneitself
is a kind ofcommonproperty among the participants in it. However messy and
theoretically unsatisfying compromise and negotiation may be, they are the
signals of a common cause among all the participants in a larger enterprise.
